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Americans have come to take for granted that constant changes in the
social, economic, and cultural conditions of life are inevitable and on the
whole desirable. Our major institutions are expected to increase steadily in
productivity and effectiveness. Yet we regard with concern and accept with
resignation a corresponding growth in the size of many of these institutions
and the complexity of their interrelationships. Furthermore, only in recent
years are we beginning to appreciate fully that the same social forces that fuel
this growth also create major social problems equally large and difficult to
understand. The central purpose of this symposium is to inquire how such
problems arise and how they can be dealt with more successfully. Since the
focus is on urban contemporary problems, there is implicit the assumption that
the simple homespun solutions that guided economic, social, and moral deci-
sions about these problems in a rural society may no longer be adequate.
It is becoming increasingly difficult to arrive at a balanced assessment of
the crime problem- an assessment that takes adequate account of the many
other costs and benefits of the profound social changes that have also made
crime a prominent national problem. Public alarm about crime has been rising
steadily. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Justice, commonly referred to as the National Crime Commission, re-
ported last year that opinion polls in recent years have shown a steady increase
in the percent of persons concerned about their personal safety against street
crimes.' Furthermore, most people questioned thought the situation was get-
ting worse.2 Under such conditions pressures mount rapidly for quick and
decisive solutions accompanied by a growing impatience with analyses or solu-
tions that seek to take account of the intractability and complexity of the prob-
lem. It is all the more important, therefore, that symposiums such as this be
employed for realistic and frank discussion of the actual dimensions of the
problem of crime and law enforcement.
II. Explaining Crime Trends
Virtually everywhere throughout the country, in big cities, suburbs, towns,
and rural areas, the crime statistics show a sharp increase in all types of crime
since 1960. The number of violent crimes against persons including willful
homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, and robbery that were reported
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by police to the FBI in 1966 were 49 percent more than the number reported
in 1960.' The crime rate for these offenses per hundred thousand persons in
the population was 37 percent higher in 1966 as compared to 1960.1 Crimes
against property increased even more drastically. Reports of burglaries, larcenies
over $50, and auto thefts were 64 percent more numerous in 1966, and the
rate of these offenses per hundred thousand persons was up 50 percent.'
Furthermore, the most recent figures released by the Uniform Crime Re-
ports Section of the FBI show an accelerating trend in crime reports. In the
first nine months of 1967, as contrasted with the same period in 1966, the
number of reports for all seven crimes listed above, which form the Crime Index
used by the FBI, was up 16 percent." The number of increased reports for
some crimes are fantastic -willful homicide up 16 percent, forcible rape up
7 percent, aggravated assault up 9 percent, burglary up 16 percent, larceny up
15 percent, and auto theft up 17 percent.? The most striking change of all
was an increase in reported robberies of 27 percent.8
Confronted with such figures, it is hardly surprising that public alarm
about crime is increasingly more openly expressed. This is to be expected when
each year quarterly reports, in addition to a very detailed annual report, which
are backed by the authoritative prestige of the FBI, constantly reiterate the
message. The Uniform Crime Reports Section is careful to break the figures
down by individual crimes as well as providing totals for all crimes. However,
the mass media are frequently less detailed in their reporting. Headlines will
often simply quote the FBI report of a large percentage increase in "serious
crimes," which is the phrase commonly used to describe those offenses included
in the Crime Index. Since the average citizen is likely to regard physical assaults
by strangers as the most serious type of crime, there is undoubtedly a natural
inclination to assume that this is what the report is about. Actually, of course,
the three property crimes, burglary, larceny over $50, and auto theft, make up
over 87 percent of the crimes covered by the Index. Thus, not only the soaring
figures but the way these figures are reported in the mass media will exert a
strong influence on the public perception of the crime problem. Given this
situation, persons who have never been victimized by crime could still justifiably
manifest a growing concern. Since these figures on crime trends may have such
an important effect on public attitudes about crime, it is worthwhile to inquire
how reliable they may be and how they may be affected by other social changes
occurring in our society at the same time.
A. Changes Affecting the Reporting of Crime
A great number of illustrations could be offered to demonstrate the way
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changes in police reporting practices affect the figures on volume and trend of
crime. Especially dramatic are the changes in the Chicago and New York crime
reports brought about by the establishment of a central reporting unit through
which all citizen complaints are routed. In the early fifties, during the first year
of operation of the new central unit in New York, reported burglary offenses
increased 1300 percent and robberies 400 percent.8 Chicago had a similar
experience following the installation of a central complaint and dispatching
system in 1959.10 The way crimes are handled and classified by the police can
also make a great difference. For example, in recent years the professionaliza-
tion of the police and an increased tendency to make formal records of com-
plaints, particularly against juveniles, may have contributed to the sharp increases
reported in juvenile crimes. There is also a large element of discretion in whether
the forcible appropriation of a boy's bicycle by another youth should be classified
as a misdemeanor, a petty or grand larceny, or a robbery. According to a recent
report, the revised reporting system that was initiated in New York City in
March, 1966 tends to upgrade the classification of such offenses to a more
serious level.11
On the other hand, there are several reasons why one might expect the
police to be reluctant to report as much crime as they find. Probably
most important is that the effectiveness of their performance will ordinarily be
judged by whether the crime rate goes up or down. In most other situations
in our society, when we wish to reach a reliable evaluation of achievement on
the part of a person or organization, we search for or construct objective mea-
sures not subject to the control of those being assessed. Yet our judgment of
police effectiveness depends in large part on the crime statistics they are urged
to supply voluntarily. I cannot imagine a situation with more pressures and
opportunities for subterfuge and management control over the results reported.
The history of crime statistics is replete with repeated exposures of fabrication
of reports. In fact, given this control over reporting by the police, the pertinent
question is why the reported volume and rates of crime have increased so greatly
throughout the country in the last two years.
I believe we are now getting fuller and more accurate reporting by the
police than we have ever had before. The pressures on the police not to report
more crime have been substantially reduced and in many large jurisdictions
reversed. One factor in this situation has been a series of Supreme Court deci-
sions widely regarded by law enforcement officials and influential groups of
citizens as constituting a severe handicap to effective crime control. I do not
wish to get into the very complex questions involved in that debate. However,
it should be noted that a "handcuffed" police force cannot be held as fully
responsible for sharp increases in crime as one that is not.
A second factor is that increasing public concern about the safety of the
streets has generated vigorous demands for more police protection and a grow-
ing public recognition of the limited capacity of many police agencies to mount
9 Cra . REPORT 26.
10 Id.
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an effective program of crime control and prevention. Crime seems to be getting
out of hand, engulfing new neighborhoods and erupting in riotous assault, looting,
and arson in the central slum areas of the big cities. A statistical report that
did not show more crime under such conditions would seem puzzling indeed
to the ordinary citizen. A cyclical pattern has been set in motion where the
increasing public readiness to accept an accurate portrayal of the full dimen-
sions of the crime problem meets an increased willingness to supply it. As the
iceberg of crime rises to the surface of public visibility the need to bring new
and more sophisticated resources to bear on the law enforcement task will become
increasingly evident.
The evidence for these observations rests largely on attitude surveys and
interviews with police and samples of citizens conducted under the auspices
of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice and also on the continuing reports from the major opinion poll organi-
zations. They are also supported by the impressions I have received in contacts
with law enforcement officials. However, there is an additional factor that
must be taken into account -the reservoir of crime not reported to the police.
A national survey of 10,000 households was conducted for the President's Com-
mission to discover the experiences of the general public as victims of crime.Y2
This survey showed, for example, that "forcible rapes were more than 3/2 times
the reported rate, burglaries three times, aggravated assaults and larcenies of
$50 and over more than double, and robbery 50 percent greater than the re-
ported rate.""3 Other surveys in high crime rate districts of large cities revealed
greater discrepancies. In Washington, D.C. the number of offenses reported
to the survey proved to be three to ten times more, depending on the type of
offense, than the number of police reports.14 Among the most frequently men-
tioned reasons for not reporting were that the victim felt it was a private matter,
he did not want to harm the offender, the police could not be effective, or he
would not want to be bothered.
Though these surveys of individual citizens and households reveal a sub-
stantial amount of crimes not brought to police attention, they represent only
a part of the reservoir of unreported crime. Commercial establishments, build-
ing industries, trucking firms, warehouses, business offices, and a number of
other economic enterprises suffer robberies, burglaries, and thefts that are not
reported. Similarly the thefts from and damages to schools, government in-
stallations, public utilities, and community service institutions often do not get
recorded. There are of course many forms of fraud, embezzlement, tax evasion,
and other white collar crimes that are not reported to the police and are not
reflected in crime statistics. However, I am primarily concerned here with the
common crimes that now arouse the public.
The main point is that there exists a large pool of unreported crime that
can be tapped in a number of ways to swell the totals of reported crime. Sig-
12 NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED
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nifcant increases in police manpower and efficiency will result in more crimes
being discovered. Greater confidence by citizens in the possibility of effective
police action would inspire more citizens to report to the police. But how is
one to know whether an increase in reported crime represents merely a deeper
drain on the reservoir of unreported crime or an actual increase in the volume
and rate of criminal acts in the society? Our crime reporting system has no
objective base line against which to measure the success of improvements in
crime control and prevention.
The police are victimized by this situation as much as anybody. If they
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations, they will produce
an increase in the rates of complaints, arrests, and convictions. However, as
matters now stand these figures are also used to show that crime conditions are
getting worse. Only if it could be shown that the rates of victimization of indi-
viduals, households, and organizations were going down at the same time would
the police clearly get credit for doing a better job. They would also then have
some objective means of testing the relative effectiveness of different crime
control measures. Though there are still many limitations in the survey approach
to the establishment of an objective rate of criminal victimization, concentrated
work on such devices could take law enforcement out of the "numbers game"
and provide some of the tools for a rational development of policies and pro-
grams of crime control.
B. Social Changes Affecting the Volume and Trends of Crime
It should not be inferred from these observations that recent increases in
the volume and trend of reported crimes are wholly attributable to changes in
reporting practices. Clearly such changes can have a significant impact, but
there are very good reasons for expecting large increases even if reporting prac-
tices stayed the same. One of the most important grounds for such a prediction
is in the changing age distribution. Most major crimes are committed by young
men under the age of twenty-five.' 5 The highest arrest rates are for the 15
to 17 year-old age group and the next highest for those age 18 to 20.16 For
example, teenagers from 11 to 17 years of age account for approximately half
of the burglaries, motor vehicle thefts, and larcenies over $50, and offenders
arrested for the crimes of forcible rape and robbery are concentrated most heavily
in the 18 to 24 year-old group.' It should also be noted that since "1961
nearly 1 million more youths have reached the ages of maximum risk each
year than did so in the prior year."'" The sharp rise in property crimes already
experienced will be followed by significant increases in crimes against persons
as these youth become 18 to 24 years of age, which they are already doing in
large numbers. Our jails as well as our colleges are bulging at the seams. The
President's Commission concluded that 40 to 50 percent of the total increase
in reported arrests between 1960 and 1965, assuming no change in the rate
15 Id. at 56.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 28.
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of arrests in that period, "could have been expected as the result of increases
in population and changes in the age composition of the population."'"
Another important social trend is the massive migration of rural dwellers
to the cities, which for many years have had much higher crime rates than the
rural areas. The average rate for every Index crime except burglary is at least
twice as great in cities over a million in population than in suburbs or rural
areas.2" Estimates prepared by the President's Commission concluded that the
movement of population between metropolitan, small city, and rural areas
accounted for about 7 to 8 percent of the increase in Index crimes between
1960 and 1965.2" Clearly much more of the increase could be predicted if
data were available to take account of the complex interactive effects of age
composition, urbanization, sex, race, income levels, and the number of slum
dwellers. However, the incompatibility between crime data and demographic
data and the lack of detail prohibit such studies, regardless of how useful they
might be in predicting the dimensions of the crime problem in future years.
There are other changes in our society that are probably having a sig-
nificant effect on the number and rate of crimes, but they are hard to measure.
Greatly increased material prosperity means there are more goods around to be
stolen. Affluence may also breed careless attitudes toward the safeguarding of
property. Cars with keys inside or unlocked ignitions account for more than
40 percent of the auto thefts.22 Theft of accessories or goods from cars repre-
sents 40 percent of all reported larcenies.23 We tolerate increasing rates of branch-
bank robberies, shoplifting, and employee theft because the various types of
cost associated with adequate protection may exceed the current losses from
these crimes. We do not know to what extent the increasing sale of compre-
hensive homeowner insurance policies, including protection against crime losses,
invites indifference about protecting goods and locking doors. Yet we do know
that burglaries are increasing rapidly in the suburban areas. The FBI reported a
17 percent increase in suburban burglaries in the first nine months of 1967
as compared to a similar period in 1966."4 Even more startling is the increase
in robberies in the same period, for example, business houses -38 percent,
chain stores -39 percent, and banks -60 percent.2 5 The failure to take
adequate security precautions to reduce the attractiveness of these opportunities
to increasingly mobile offenders may be part of the explanation.
In marked contrast to this rising affluence is the relative deprivation of
the urban slum communities. Big cities have always offered such contrasts.
The difference, today, appears to lie in the rising expectations of the poor for
a share in this affluence. They are impatient to lay claim to this share and
resent the limited opportunities to do so, especially when the barriers to these
opportunities are reinforced by racial discrimination. The depth of this anger
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violent encounters between police and residents of the ghetto areas. The riots
release people from the normal constraints of everyday life and create a Roman
holiday atmosphere where widespread involvement in looting gains crowd
support. I cannot help believing that these same social pressures also greatly
reduce the restraining influence of conventional morality or law for many indi-
viduals outside riot situations. The New York Police Department recently
reported that in 1963 there were 2621 assaults on police and in 1967 there were
4409.2" In such a climate of hostility to law enforcement, it would seem rea-
sonable to expect higher rates of individual as well as collective law violation.
The changes taking place in the relationships between police and residents
of slum neighborhoods, especially in Negro areas, are not solely toward greater
conflict. Changes are taking place in several directions at once. Surveys of
police-community relations in ghetto areas reveal conflicting attitudes about
police and law enforcement. On the one hand the residents of these communi-
ties are more critical of the police than are other citizens for what they regard
as improper, undignified, brutal, or discriminatory treatment. At the same time
they are more insistent than the residents of other areas concerning more and
better police protection and are willing to support the police in their demands
for more resources, better training, and more adequate salaries.27 Yet this
apparent ambivalence is not hard to understand when it is recognized that the
residents of ghetto communities also bear the heaviest burden as victims of
crime.2"
In the opinion of police experts, the residents of these areas are not only
demanding more protection but getting more than they used to. Prior to World
War II the police were called on to preserve order in the urban ghettoes, to
settle serious domestic disputes, to break up street fights or tavern brawls, and
to keep crimes of vice within the limits of community tolerance. Laws were
enforced only when the residents demanded it and were ready to appear as
complainants.
Now expectations have changed. Residents in the ghetto communities
demand their right to protection by the police and the law, equal to that ac-
corded other areas of the city. They want active law enforcement in these
communities, not just maintenance of the peace, and they want it performed
with the same regard for the dignity and rights of citizens that would be shown
in other areas. Furthermore, police officials say that they are getting law enforce-
ment comparable to that accorded other areas more than they ever have before.
In fact, studies of the most developed professional police departments show that
great care is taken to provide "color-blind" law enforcement.29 It seems inevitable
that this change will produce higher rates of reported crimes where at one time
those same crimes were ignored by the official reports. In addition, if the police
show a greater willingness to take action in behalf of victims of crime, this will
26 N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1968, at 58, col. 3.
27 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JusTIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 91-93 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as TFR ON CRIME ASSESSMENT].
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in turn produce a greater readiness to appeal to the police for help and to appear
as complainants. Under such circumstances there may not be any more crimes
committed in these neighborhoods than there were twenty years ago, but now
they will be officially recorded and will boost the total amount and rate of
reported crimes.
One further social change that undoubtedly exerts a powerful influence
on the higher crime rates for individual cities should be noted. With the growth
of the large metropolis, middle-income groups that once lived in the city now
live in the suburbs. The pressures of urban redevelopment and the need of the
ever growing mass of low-income urban migrants for housing has caused inva-
sion and displacement of populations from areas that formerly housed upper
and middle-income families. High crime rates have constantly been associated
with high density and low-income areas of residence. As the low-income groups
come to occupy a greater proportion of the available housing within the city
boundaries, the amount and rate of crime for the city can be expected to increase.
Thus, when we compare the crime rate of a city with the rate of crime it had
10, 20 or 30 years ago, it is much like comparing a high crime district with
the city as a whole. The President's Commission compared the 1940 robbery
rates in several cities to those in 1965 within the city and within the metropoli-
tan area. Allowing for improvements in police reporting today, the rates of the
cities in 1940 and the metropolitan areas in 1965 were roughly comparable,
while city rates in 1965 varied from 70 percent to 400 percent higher than
in 1940.0
C. Evaluation of Crime Trends
There is no doubt that there are more crimes committed today than there
were 10 or 20 years ago. Simply on the basis of population increase, urbaniza-
tion, and disproportionate growth of the youth population, one could safely
make this statement. It is also undoubtedly true that many areas within the
boundaries of large cities threaten much greater risk of victimization by serious
crimes than they did in years past. However, no one can prove on the basis
of the information we now have that people today have a greater propensity to
commit crime than they did formerly. In fact it would be equally difficult to
prove that the crime rate is really increasing as fast as the reported figures sug-
gest. If proper allowance could be made for the effects of the various social
changes described above, the increase might be very little or none at all. In
other words, if we had better data we might conclude that crime rates were
not of epidemic proportions but within predictable limits.
III. The Control of Crime
The foregoing discussion should not be taken to mean that we do not have
a serious problem with crime today. Instead it highlights how much of the prob-
lem would have been predictable if we had had better data. In fact, the dis-
30 TFR ON CRIME ASSESSMENT, table 17, at 37.
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cussion of unreported crime suggests that we are probably worse off than current
figures show and have been for some time without realizing it. Public fear of
crime is unquestionably widespread and increasing. Some of the possible reasons
for this fear have already been mentioned, but two more reasons should be
taken into account.
Repeatedly the complaint is heard that parks, passageways, and street cor-
ners in the city which once were safe are now dangerous. As I have already
indicated this may at least partly be attributed to the fact that traditionally high
crime producing, low-income groups are spreading throughout the city and in-
creasing population density in formerly thinly populated areas. Thus it is un-
doubtedly true that serious crimes now occur in city areas where once they were
rare.
The second point is that public fear of violent crime has undoubtedly been
greatly aggravated by the ghetto riots of the last few summers. Fear of crime
in the streets has to a considerable extent become merged with a pervasive fear
of the often strident and violent demands of Negroes for greater equality of
access to the economic, political, social, and cultural opportunities of the Ameri-
can way of life. Fear of crime serves as an easily justified camouflage for a more
pervasive fear of racial integration, which is much harder to debate publicly.
In fact, fear of crime is so often associated with fear of Negro violence and com-
petition that it is impossible to tell where one leaves off and the other begins.
It must also be admitted that these assertions are frankly speculative. The evi-
dence on which they rest is more impressionistic and intuitive than factual. Never-
theless, I do believe that we would be able to do a far better job if we could
clearly separate the race relations problem from the crime problem. The fact
that Negroes form the vast majority of the new urban poor and appear in such
disproportionate numbers in our police lockups, courts, and prisons makes this
separation difficult to achieve, despite the fact that the urban poor have always
been disproportionately represented in the criminal dockets whether they were
of German, Irish, Polish, or Italian extraction.
Nevertheless, the public fear of crime is a fact that must be met by action.
Where these fears are unrealistically inflated, there is a public obligation to
provide accurate accounts of what the dangers really are so that people can
judge for themselves what precautions they wish to take or what risks they will
run. Where these fears are realistically grounded in the increasing threat of
violent crime, effective crime control and prevention programs must be de-
veloped. It is not possible at this time to review all that might or ought to be
done to achieve better control of the crime problem. The President's Commission
presented 205 recommendations for action.31 Many of them were designed to
convert a creaking and outmoded system of criminal justice, better suited to a
rural frontier society, into a system adapted to the problems of modem urban
living. I should like instead to comment on several strategic problems and
proposals.
31 CRI1mz REPORT 293-301.
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A. Effectiveness of Aggressive Law Enforcement Practices.
One of the most commonly encountered proposals is that the police should
get tougher and engage in more aggressive patrol and law enforcement in the
urban Negro ghettoes and other high crime rate areas. Such proposals have a
beguiling, logical simplicity. If criminals are running amuck, fight them with
a vastly superior repressive force. However, the relative cost and effectiveness
of such an approach in comparison to alternative or supplementary forms of
crime prevention and control must be taken inta account.
Police on patrol provide citizens with a sense of security. They observe
crime and make arrests in great numbers to preserve the public order. However,
forty-five percent of all arrests involve "crimes without victims," such as drunken-
ness, gambling, prostitution, vagrancy, disorderly conduct, and liquor law viola-
tions.82 Police patrols are also available for radio dispatch when complaints are
received at the control center. However, very few of the arrests for major
felonies are a result of police discovering a crime in process and catching the
criminal "red-handed." Virtually all major felony arrests occur as a result of
citizen complaints and identifications of suspects. A study conducted by the
President's Commission in Los Angeles found that a total of 1905 crimes studied
from the records resulted in arrests or other clearances in 25 percent of the
cases. 3 The patrol force made 90 percent of the arrests, over half of which
occurred in the first eight hours." But the most significant factor in arrest was
whether or not a suspect was named by the victim or by others at the scene of
the crime. The clearance rate in cases with named suspects was 88 percent and
for cases with unnamed suspects 12 percent.85 In addition, the speed of the
police response to a complaint made a difference. The faster the response the
more likely an arrest could be made."
Most of the crimes of violence occur between relatives, friends, or ac-
quaintances. According to several different studies, about 70 percent of the
willful homicides, almost two-thirds of the aggravated assaults, and a sizeable
majority of forcible rapes are committed by persons previously known to the
victim." Such offenses are virtually impossible to prevent by patrol since they
occur mainly in bedrooms, kitchens, and bars. Also most crimes of burglary,
larceny, and auto theft are crimes of stealth undertaken with a view to evading
police observation or anyone else's for that matter.
In an effort to increase the deterrent effect of police patrols and the number
of observations of crimes in process, police departments are employing saturation
methods. This technique consists in putting an extra large number of policemen
in high crime rate areas on a randomized schedule. Sometimes tactical patrols
composed of selected, highly trained men are switched from one area to another
to catch offenders off guard. Another aggressive patrol tactic is stopping, question-
32 Id. at 20.
33 Id. at 247-48.
34 Id. at 248.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 18.
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ing and sometimes frisking persons in situations that appear in any way unusual.
In New York City, rowdyism, robbery, and assault on the subways led to assign-
ment of uniformed transit patrolmen to every train during the late night hours.
This led to a 36 percent decline in the number of crimes committed in the
subways. 8
Police report that these tactics work in the areas they are used. There are
unfortunately no studies to show whether or not crime stopped in one place pops
out at another like the flow of air in a squeezed balloon. The use of aggressive
patrol tactics may also soon raise constitutional questions relating to arrest, search
and seizure, and questioning of suspected persons in field situations that have
not yet confronted the Supreme Court in relation to the protection of individual
rights. Such aggressive tactics are also viewed with great hostility by residents
of ghetto areas in large cities and may cost more in unfavorable police-community
relations than they are worth in arrests unassisted by complainants. Clearly
these aggressive types of patrol practices have an impact on the crime problem,
but it is still not clear what costs and benefits are derived from their use.
B. Science and Technology.
Many suggestions were offered by the President's Commission's Task Force
on Science and Technology for improving the effectiveness of the criminal justice
system. They included such proposals as the development of early warning
systems by which citizens could mobilize the police, new types of police com-
munications to increase police mobility, nonlethal weapons, devices to make
autos and other objects more difficult to steal, computerized systems for informa-
tion storage, retrieval and analysis, and more experimental programs of opera-
tional research.
Unquestionably these technological aids can be helpful in facilitating
criminal justice procedures. However, as with aggressive law enforcement prac-
tices, their ultimate usefulness in crime control depends on the cooperation
citizens are prepared to give in reducing the lure of criminal opportunities and
in informing and assisting the police. The public wants police protection but
good police-community relations are essential to secure the public's active co-
operation.
C. The Criminal Repeater.
The hard core of the crime problem is the offender who develops crime
into a way of life. Such offenders learn how to make crime pay despite occasional
arrests and imprisonments. The costs are not only in the injuries they inflict
or the property they steal, but in the example they offer to younger men of a
set of attitudes toward life that leads inevitably to a criminal career. Most of
these careers start early. The President's Commission concluded that
Studies made of the careers of adult offenders regularly show the
38 Id. at 95.
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importance of juvenile delinquency as a forerunner of adult crime. They
support the conclusions that the earlier a juvenile is arrested or brought
to court for an offense, the more likely he is to carry on criminal activity
into adult life; that the more serious the first offense for which a juvenile
is arrested, the more likely he is to continue to commit serious crimes,
especially in the case of major crimes against property; and that the more
frequently and-extensively a juvenile is processed by the police, court, and
correctional system the more likely he is to be arrested, charged, convicted,
and imprisoned as an adult. These studies also show that the most frequent
pattern among adult offenders is one that starts with petty stealing and
progresses to much more serious property offenses.39
The greatest failure of our system of crime control is our inability to induce
known offenders to undertake a law-abiding course of life. Considering the
way initial acts of delinquency escalate into careers of serious crime, it appears
undeniable that the most strategic focus of crime prevention and control would
be to devise effective means for terminating criminal careers at the earliest pos-
sible stage. If we were successful in this, a major share of the grave losses we
now suffer from serious crimes could be averted. A study of the probation rec-
ords of 932 felons convicted during the years 1964 and 1965 in Washington,
D.C. showed that 80 percent had adult criminal records40 In addition, more
than half (52 percent) had six or more prior arrests, and 65 percent of them
had previously been confined in a juvenile or adult institution."
To release offenders with such histories of crime is to run a high risk of
further offenses. Yet such men cannot be confined permanently. Neither law,
humanity nor economic cost would permit it. The only answer is the develop-
ment of intensive processes for rehabilitation and reintegration of these men into
constructive and satisfying patterns of everyday living. This would require a
much higher correctional cost per man than we now are expending. It would
also require a greater readiness on the part of the law-abiding community to
provide to these men a measure of acceptance and opportunity that is not now
available. We must come to learn that to pay this kind of cost and take this
kind of risk is in the end much the easier and safer path. The idea that criminals
can be persuaded by ill treatment and stiff sentences to acquire a respect for
and obedience to the law is simply a middle-class delusion. If anything it works
precisely the opposite. The implementation of the law should be firm and just,
but the treatment it accords its convicted offenders should be designed to restore
them to a constructive role in society. This cannot be done for persons of low
status in this complex bureaucratic world by trying to instill fear of further
punishment. It can only be accomplished by helping the offender to find a
new, law-abiding place for himself and encouraging him until he settles into it.
I know of no better protection against crime than a truly effective system of
correctional treatment for convicted offenders. I also do not know of any
existing system today that is "truly effective." Research evaluation studies are
just now beginning to sort out the programs that work best. I am confident,
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however, that such a system can be developed if the financial resources, freedom
to experiment, and community backing can be secured.
D. Crime Prevention.
The character of the crime problem would also change greatly if the broad
programs to rebuild the cities, to erase the slums, to transform the patterns of
race relations, and to raise the general level of economic, political and cultural
achievement of our poorest people were ever able to get under way. The violent
crimes have always occurred most frequently among the lowest socio-economic
groups in our large urban centers. As these groups have moved up and become
socialized to a middle-class way of life, their crimes have changed to the white-
collar variety of economic crimes. The war on poverty may not change the total
crime rate, but it may serve to make the crime burden more tolerable.
In the short run, strict law enforcement and strong crime suppression
strategies may make an impression on the crime problem. In an emergency,
such as a full-scale riot, no other alternative exists. But in the long run, the
only hope for curtailing the various forms of individual and collective violence
we are now experiencing is to develop a system of open opportunities that will
give each citizen a chance to stake out a claim to a successful, satisfying, and
law-abiding way of life.
[Sy-posium, 1968]
